Given an arbitrary one-way function F , is it possible to design a signature scheme where the secret key is an input x to F and the public key is y = F (x)? We show that signatures that are "key-versatile" in this sense, while also meeting stronger-than-usual security conditions we define, enable us to add signature-based integrity that is "for-free" in terms of key material, meaning we can sign with keys already in use for another purpose without impacting the security of the original purpose or in turn being impacted by it. We show applications across diverse areas including (1) security against related-key attack (RKA) (2) security for key-dependent messages (KDM), and (3) joint encryption and signing. We show how to build key-versatile signature schemes and then obtain new results in all these application domains in a modular way.
Introduction
Let F be a one-way function. Let us say that a signature scheme is F -keyed if the secret signing key is a random domain point x for F and the public verification key is its image y = F (x). Many known signature schemes are F -keyed for some particular F chosen to make the scheme work. For example, Schnorr signatures [59] are F -keyed for F (x) = g x where g generates the underlying cyclic group. In this paper, we consider the converse question. Namely, given an arbitrary one-way function F , can we construct an F -keyed signature scheme? Further, raising the bar, we will ask our "key-versatile" signatures to meet simulatability and key-extractability conditions that are significantly stronger than the usual unforgeability.
Why do we want this? Briefly, it gives us signing that is "for free" in terms of key material. We can take keys, already in use for some purpose and not created or structured for signing, and sign with them, without impacting the security of the original use of the keys. This ability to add authenticity without changing the key structure allows us in particular to retain security against related-key attack (RKA) or for key-dependent messages (KDM), so that we can expand our capabilities in these challenging areas in a modular way, leveraging previous work rather than starting from scratch. We begin, however, with a more direct application, namely adding signing to encryption with zero overhead in the size of the public key.
We warn that our results are theoretical feasibility ones. They demonstrate that certain practical goals can in principle be reached, but the solutions are not efficient.
Joining signatures to encryption with zero public-key overhead. Suppose Alice has keys (sk e , pk e ) for a public-key encryption scheme and wants to also have signing capability. Certainly, she could pick new and separate keys (sk s , pk s ) enabling her to use her favorite signature scheme. However, it means that Alice's public key, now pk = (pk e , pk s ), has doubled in size. Practitioners ask if one can do better. We want a joint encryption and signature (JES) scheme [47, 55] , where there is a single key-pair (sk , pk ) used for both encryption and signing. We aim to minimize the public-key overhead, (loosely) defined as the size of pk minus the size of the public key pk e of the underlying encryption scheme.
Haber and Pinkas [47] initiated an investigation of JES. They note that the key re-use requires defining and achieving new notions of security particular to JES: signatures should remain unforgeable even in the presence of a decryption oracle, and encryption should retain IND-CCA privacy even in the presence of a signing oracle. In the random oracle model [16] , specific IND-CCA-secure public-key encryption schemes have been presented where signing can be added with no public-key overhead [47, 34, 51] . In the standard model, encryption schemes have been presented that allow signing with a public-key overhead lower than that of the "Cartesian product" solution of just adding a separate signing key [47, 55] , with the best results, from [55] , using IBE or combining encryption and signature schemes of [28, 24] .
All these results, however, pertain to specific encryption schemes. We step back to ask a general theoretical question. Namely, suppose we are given an arbitrary IND-CCA-secure public-key encryption scheme. We wish to add signing capability to form a JES scheme. How low can the public-key overhead go? The (perhaps surprising) answer we provide is that we can achieve a public-key overhead of zero. The public key for our JES scheme remains exactly that of the given encryption scheme, meaning we add signing capability without changing the public key. 1 We emphasize again that this is for any starting encryption scheme.
To do this, we let F be the function that maps the secret key of the given encryption scheme to the public key. 2 The assumed security of the encryption scheme means this function is one-way. Now, we public-key encryption [2] and authenticated symmetric encryption [14, 56] , even in the absence of KDM considerations.)
A natural approach to achieve our goal is for Alice to encrypt under a symmetric, KDM-secure scheme and sign the ciphertexts under a conventional signature scheme. But it is not clear how to prove the resulting storage scheme is KDM-secure. The difficulty is that sk would include the signing key in addition to the encryption (and decryption) key K, so that messages depend on both these keys while the KDM security of the encryption only covers messages depending on K. We could attempt to start from scratch and design a secure storage scheme meeting our notions. But key-versatile signatures offer a simpler and more modular solution. Briefly, we take a KDM-secure public-key encryption scheme and let F be the one-way function that maps a secret key to a public key. Alice holds (only) a secret key sk and the server holds pk = F (sk ). To upload M , Alice re-computes pk from sk , encrypts M under it using the KDM scheme, and signs the ciphertext with an F -keyed signature scheme using the same key sk . The server verifies signatures under pk .
In Section 6 we present in full the construction outlined above, and prove that it meets our notion of KDM security. The crux, as for our RKA-secure constructions, is that adding signing capability without changing the keys puts us in a position to exploit the assumed KDM security of the underlying encryption scheme. The strong simulatability and key-extractability properties of our signatures do the rest. We note that as an added bonus, we assume only CPA KDM security of the base encryption scheme, yet our storage scheme achieves CCA KDM security.
Getting F -keyed signatures. In Section 3 we define F -keyed signature schemes and show how to construct them for arbitrary one-way F . This enables us to realize the above applications.
Our simulatability condition, adapting [1, 33] , asks for a trapdoor allowing the creation of simulated signatures given only the message and public key, even when the secret key underlying this public key is adversarially chosen. Our key-extractability condition asks that, using the same trapdoor, one can extract from a valid signature the corresponding secret key, even when the public key is adversarially chosen. Theorem 3.1, showing these conditions imply not just standard but strong unforgeability, functions not just as a sanity check but as a way to introduce, in a simple form, a proof template that we will extend for our applications.
Our construction of an F -keyed signature scheme is a minor adaptation of a NIZK-based signature scheme of Dodis, Haralambiev, López-Alt and Wichs [38] , in turn a simplification of the NIZK-based signature scheme of [11] that is made possible by the significant advances in NIZK technology since [11] . While [38] prove leakage-resilience of their scheme, we prove simulatability and key-extractability. The underlying SE NIZKs are a variant of simulation-sound extractable NIZKs [37, 45, 46] introduced by [38] (they called them tSE NIZKs) and shown by [38, 48] to be achievable for all of NP under standard assumptions.
Discussion and related work. Signcryption [61] , authenticated public-key encryption [2] , JES [47, 55] and our secure storage goal all have in common that both encryption and signature are involved. However, in signcryption and authenticated public-key encryption, there are two parties and thus two sets of keys, Alice encrypting under Bob's public key and signing under her own secret key. In JES and secure storage, there is one set of keys, namely Alice's. Thus for signcryption and authenticated public-key encryption, the question of using the same keys for the two purposes, which is at the core of our goals and methods, does not arise. Self-signcryption [40] is however similar to secure storage, minus the key-dependent message aspect. Authenticated symmetric encryption [14, 56] also involves both encryption and authentication, but under a shared key, while JES and secure storage involve public keys. KDM-secure authenticated symmetric encryption was studied in [12, 6] .
KDM-secure signatures were studied in [54] , who show limitations on the security achievable. Our secure storage scheme bypasses these limitations by signing ciphertexts rather than plaintexts and by avoiding KDM-secure signatures altogether: we use F -keyed signatures and are making no standalone claims or assumptions regarding their KDM security. Combining KDM encryption and KDM signatures would not give us KDM-secure storage because the keys for the two primitives would be different and we want joint KDM security.
Secure storage is an amalgam of symmetric and asymmetric cryptography, encryption being of the former kind and authentication of the latter. With secure storage, we are directly modeling a goal of practical interest rather than trying to create a general-purpose tool like many of the other works just mentioned. The difference between JES and secure storage is that in the former, arbitrary messages may be signed, while in the latter only ciphertexts may be signed. The difference is crucial for KDM security, which for JES would inherit the limitations of KDM-secure signatures just mentioned, but is not so limited for secure storage.
Notation
The empty string is denoted by ε. If x is a (binary) string then |x| is its length. If S is a finite set then |S| denotes its size and s ←$ S denotes picking an element uniformly from S and assigning it to s. We denote by λ ∈ N the security parameter and by 1 λ its unary representation.
Algorithms are randomized unless otherwise indicated. "PT" stands for "polynomial-time," whether for randomized algorithms or deterministic. By y ← A(x 1 , . . . ; R), we denote the operation of running algorithm A on inputs x 1 , . . . and coins R and letting y denote the output. By y ←$ A(x 1 , . . .), we denote the operation of letting y ← A(x 1 , . . . ; R) for random R. We denote by [A(x 1 , . . .)] the set of points that have positive probability of being output by A on inputs x 1 , . . .. Adversaries are algorithms.
We use games in definitions of security and in proofs. A game G (eg. Figure 1 ) has a main procedure whose output (what it returns) is the output of the game. We let Pr[G] denote the probability that this output is the boolean true. The boolean flag bad, if used in a game, is assumed initialized to false.
Key-versatile signing signatures
We define F-keyed signature schemes, for F a family of functions rather than the single function F used for simplicity in Section 1. The requirement is that the secret key sk is an input for an instance fp of the family and the public key pk = F.Ev(1 λ , fp, sk ) is the corresponding image under this instance, the instance fp itself specified in public parameters. We intend to use these schemes to add authenticity in a setting where keys (sk , pk ) may already be in use for another purpose (such as encryption). We need to ensure that signing will neither lessen the security of the existing usage of the keys nor have its own security be lessened by it. To ensure this strong form of composability, we define simulatability and key-extractability requirements for our F-keyed schemes. The fact that the keys will already be in use for another purpose also means that we do not have the luxury of picking the family F, but must work with an arbitrary family emerging from another setting. The only assumption we will make on F is thus that it is one-way. (This is necessary, else security is clearly impossible.) With the definitions in place, we go on to indicate how to build F-keyed signature schemes for arbitrary, one-way F.
We clarify that being F-keyed under an F assumed to be one-way does not mean that security (simulatability and key-extractability) of the signature scheme is based solely on the assumption that F is one-way. The additional assumption is a SE-secure NIZK. (But this itself can be built under standard assumptions.) It is possible to build a signature scheme that is unforgeable assuming only that a given F is one-way [57] , but this scheme will not be F-keyed relative to the same F underlying its security, and it will not be simulatable or key-extractable.
Signature schemes. A signature scheme DS specifies the following PT algorithms: via pp ←$ DS.Pg(1 λ ) one generates public parameters pp common to all users; via (sk , pk ) ←$ DS.Kg(1 λ , pp) a user can generate a secret signing key sk and corresponding public verification key pk ; via σ ←$ DS.Sig(1 λ , pp, sk , M ) the signer can generate a signature σ on a message M ∈ {0,
Figure 1: Games defining security of F-keyed signature scheme DS. Left: Game defining simulatability. Right: Game defining key-extractability.
verifier can deterministically produce a decision d ∈ {true, false} regarding whether σ is a valid signature of M under pk . Correctness requires that DS. 
F-keyed signature schemes. Let F be a function family. We say that a signature scheme DS is F-keyed if the following are true:
• Parameter compatibility: Parameters pp for DS are a pair pp = (fp, ap) consisting of parameters fp for F and auxiliary parameters ap, these independently generated. Formally, there is a PT auxiliary parameter generation algorithm APg such that DS.Pg(1 λ ) picks fp ←$ F.Pg(1 λ ) ; ap ←$ APg(1 λ ) and returns (fp, ap).
• Key compatibility: The signing key sk is a random point in the domain of F.Ev and the verifying key pk is its image under F.Ev. Formally, DS.Kg(1 λ , (fp, ap)) picks sk ←$ F.Dom(1 λ , fp), lets pk ← F.Ev(1 λ , fp, sk ) and returns (sk , pk ). (DS.Kg ignores the auxiliary parameters ap, meaning the keys do not depend on it.)
Security of F-keyed signature schemes. We require two (strong) security properties of an F-keyed signature scheme DS:
• Simulatable: Under simulated auxiliary parameters and an associated simulation trapdoor std , a simulator, given pk = F.Ev(1 λ , fp, sk ) and M , can produce a signature σ indistinguishable from the real one produced under sk , when not just M , but even the secret key sk , is adaptively chosen by the adversary. Formally, DS is simulatable if it specifies additional PT algorithms DS.SimPg (the auxiliary parameter simulator) and DS.SimSig (the signature simulator) such that Adv • Key-extractable: Under the same simulated auxiliary parameters and an associated extraction trapdoor xtd , an extractor can extract from any valid forgery relative to pk an underlying secret key sk , even when pk is chosen by the adversary and the adversary can adaptively obtain simulated signatures under secret keys of its choice. Formally, DS is key-extractable if it specifies another PT algorithm DS.Ext (the extractor) such that Adv The EXT game includes a possibly non-PT test of membership in the range of the family, but we will ensure that adversaries (who must remain PT) do not perform this test. Our definition of simulatability follows that of [33] which in turn strengthened that of [1] . Those definitions were for general signatures, not F-keyed ones, and one difference is that our simulator can set only the auxiliary parameters, not the full parameters, meaning it does not set fp.
Sim+Ext implies unforgeability. The simulatability and key-extractability notions we have defined may seem quite unrelated to the standard unforgeability requirement for signature schemes [44] . As a warm-up towards applying these new conditions, we show that in fact they imply not just the standard unforgeability but strong unforgeability, under the minimal assumption that F is one-way: Theorem 3.1 Let DS be an F-keyed signature scheme that is simulatable and key-extractable. If F is one-way then DS is strongly unforgeable.
In Appendix A we recall the definition of strong unforgeability and formally prove the above. Here we sketch the intuition. Given an adversary A against unforgeability, we build an inverter I for F. On input 1 λ , fp, pk , adversary I generates simulated auxiliary parameters ap together with simulation and extraction trapdoors. It now runs A with parameters (fp, ap), answering signing queries via the signature simulator. (Note the latter only needs the simulation trapdoor and the public key, not the secret key.) When A produces its forgery M, σ, the inverter I runs the extractor to obtain sk , a preimage of pk under F.Ev(1 λ , fp, ·). The simulation and key-extractability conditions are invoked to show that I succeeds with almost the same probability as A. This involves the construction of adversaries A 1 , A 2 for the two conditions. A question here is that these adversaries can only make signing queries under secret keys that they know, so how do they proceed not knowing sk ? The answer is that they will themselves run key-generation to get (sk , pk ) and then run A on the latter. Now, when A makes a signing query M , adversaries A 1 , A 2 can answer by invoking their own signing oracles on sk , M .
A reader may note that the above theorem would hold under weaker simulatability and extractability conditions where the adversaries do not choose secret and public keys. This is true, but the stronger conditions are crucial to other upcoming applications in this paper.
Construction.
A key-versatile signing schema is a transform KvS that given an arbitrary family of functions F returns an F-keyed signature scheme DS = KvS [F] . We want the constructed signature scheme to be simulatable and key-extractable. We now show that this is possible with the aid of appropriate NIZK systems which are themselves known to be possible under standard assumptions. In Appendix B we recall the definition of a SE (Simulation Extractable) NIZK system. SE was called tSE in [38] and is a variant of NIZK-security notions from [45, 37, 58] . We then specify the construction and prove it has the claimed properties. Here we sketch the construction and its history.
The scheme is simple. We define the relation R((1 λ , fp, pk , M ), sk ) to return true iff F.Ev(1 λ , fp, sk ) = pk . A signature of M under sk is then a SE-secure NIZK proof for this relation in which the witness is sk and the instance (input) is (1 λ , fp, pk , M ). The interesting aspect of this construction is that it at first sounds blatantly insecure, since the relation R ignores the message M . Does this not mean that a signature is independent of the message, in which case an adversary could violate unforgeability by requesting a signature σ of a message M under pk and then outputting (M , σ) as a forgery for some M = M ? What prevents this is the strength of the SE notion of NIZKs. The message M is present in the instance (1 λ , fp, pk , M ), even if it is ignored by the relation; the proof in turn depends on the instance, making the signature depend on M . Intuitively the SE-secure NIZK guarantees a form of nonmalleability, so signatures (proofs) for one message (instance) cannot be transferred to another. The formal proof of Theorem 3.2 in Appendix B shows simulatability of the F-keyed signature scheme based on the zero-knowledge property of the NIZK and key-extractability of the F-keyed signature scheme based on extractability of the NIZK, both in a natural and simple way.
A similar construction of signatures was given in [38] starting from a leakage-resilient hard relations rather than (as in our case) a relation arising from a one-way function. Our construction could be considered a special case of theirs, with the added difference that they use labeled NIZKs with the message as the label while we avoid labels and put the message in the input. The claims established about the construction are however different, with [38] establishing leakage resilience and unforgeability of the signature and our work showing simulatability and key-extractability. The technique of [38] was also used by [33] to construct malleable signatures. Going back further, the first NIZK-based signature scheme was that of [11] . This used PRFs and commitment, but only regular (as opposed to SE) NIZKs, these being all that was available at the time. One might see the simpler and more elegant modern NIZK-based signatures as being made possible by the arrival of the stronger NIZK systems of works like [37, 45, 46, 38] .
Joining signature to encryption with no public-key overhead
Let PKE be an arbitrary IND-CCA-secure public-key encryption scheme. As an example, it could be the Cramer-Shoup scheme [36] , the Kurosawa-Desmedt scheme [52] , or the DDN scheme [39] , but it could be any other IND-CCA-secure scheme as well. Alice has already established a key-pair (sk e , pk e ) for this scheme, allowing anyone to send her ciphertexts computed under pk e that she can decrypt under sk e . She wants now to add signature capability. This is easily done. She can create a key-pair (sk s , pk s ) for her favorite signature scheme and sign an arbitrary message M under sk s , verification being possible given pk s . The difficulty is that her public key is now pk = (pk e , pk s ). It is not just larger but will require a new certificate. The question we ask is whether we can add signing capability in a way that is more parsimonious with regard to public key size. Technically, we seek a joint encryption and signature (JES) scheme where Alice has a single key-pair (sk , pk ), with sk used to decrypt and sign, and pk used to encrypt and verify, each usage secure in the face of the other, and we want pk smaller than that of the trivial solution pk = (pk e , pk s ). Perhaps surprisingly, we show how to construct a JES scheme with pk-overhead zero, meaning pk is unchanged, remaining pk e . We not only manage to use sk e to sign and pk e to verify, but do so in such a way that the security of the encryption is not affected by the presence of the signature, and vice versa. Previous standard model JES schemes had been able to reduce the pk-overhead only for specific starting encryption schemes [47, 55] . Our result says the overhead can be zero regardless of the starting encryption scheme. The result is obtained by defining F as the function mapping sk e to pk e and using a simulatable and key-extractable F-keyed signature scheme with the keys remaining (sk e , pk e ).
JES schemes. A joint encryption and signature (JES) scheme JES specifies the following PT algorithms: via jp ←$ JES.Pg(1 λ ) one generates public parameters jp common to all users; via (sk , pk ) ←$ JES.Kg(1 λ , jp) a user can generate a secret (signing and decryption) key sk and corresponding public (verification and encryption) key pk ; via σ ←$ JES.Sig(1 λ , jp, sk , M ) the user can generate a signature σ on a message M ∈ {0, cally produce a decision d ∈ {true, false} regarding whether σ is a valid signature of M under pk ;
, and all M ∈ {0, 1} * . We say that JES is SUF-secure if Adv The base PKE scheme. We are given a public-key encryption scheme PKE, specifying the following PT algorithms: via fp ←$ PKE.Pg(1 λ ) one generates public parameters; via (sk , pk) ←$ PKE.Kg(1 λ , fp) a user generates a decryption key sk and encryption key pk ; via C ←$ PKE.Enc(1 λ , fp, pk , M ) anyone can generate a ciphertext C encrypting a message M under pk ; and via M ← PKE.Dec(1 λ , fp, sk , C) a user can deterministically decrypt a ciphertext C to get a value M ∈ {0, 1} * ∪ {⊥}. Correctness requires that PKE.
, and all M ∈ {0, 1} * . We assume that PKE meets the usual notion of IND-CCA security.
Let us say that PKE is canonical if the operation (sk , pk ) ←$ PKE.Kg(1 λ , fp) is done by picking sk at random from a finite, non-empty set we denote PKE.SK(1 λ , fp), and then applying to (1 λ , fp, sk ) a PT deterministic public-key derivation function we denote PKE.PK to get pk . Canonicity may seem like an extra assumption, but isn't. First, many (most) schemes are already canonical. This is true for the Cramer-Shoup scheme [36] , the Kurosawa-Desmedt scheme [52] and for schemes obtained via the BCHK transform [25] applied to the identity-based encryption schemes of Boneh-Boyen [23] or Waters [60] . Second, if by chance a scheme is not canonical, we can modify it be so. Crucially (for our purposes), the modification does not change the public key. (But it might change the secret key.) Briefly, the modification, which is standard, is to use the random coins of the key generation algorithm as the secret key. In some more detail, given PKE, the new key-generation algorithm, on inputs 1 λ , fp, picks random coins ω, lets (sk , pk ) ← PKE.Kg(1 λ , fp; ω), and returns (ω, pk ), so that the new secret key is ω and the public key is still pk . Encryption is unchanged. The modified decryption algorithm, given 1 λ , fp, ω, C, lets (sk , pk ) ←$ PKE.Kg(1 λ , fp; ω) and outputs M ← PKE.Dec(1 λ , fp, sk , C). It is easy to see that the modified scheme is canonical and also inherits both the correctness and the IND-CCA security of the original scheme.
Construction. Given canonical PKE as above, we construct a JES scheme JES. The first step is to construct from PKE a function family F as follows: let F.Pg = PKE.Pg, so the parameters of F are the same those of PKE; let F.Dom = PKE.SK, so the domain of F is the space of secret keys of PKE; and let F.Ev = PKE.PK, so that the function defined by fp maps a secret key to a corresponding public key. Now let DS be an F-keyed signature scheme that is simulatable and key-extractable. ( We can obtain DS via Theorem 3.2.) Now we define our JES scheme JES. Let JES.Pg = DS.Pg, so that parameters for JES have the form jp = (fp, ap), where fp are parameters for F, which by definition of F are also parameters for PKE. Let JES.Kg = DS.Kg. (Keys are those of PKE which are also those of DS.) Let JES.Sig = DS.Sig and JES.Ver = DS.Ver, meaning the signing and verifying algorithms of the joint scheme JES are inherited from the signature scheme DS. Let JES.Enc(1 λ , (fp, ap), pk , M ) return PKE.Enc(1 λ , fp, pk , M ) and let JES.Dec(1 λ , (fp, ap), sk , C) return PKE.Dec(1 λ , fp, sk , C), so that the encryption and decryption algorithms of the joint scheme JES are inherited from the PKE scheme PKE. Note that the public key of the joint scheme JES is exactly that of PKE, so there is zero public-key overhead. (If PKE had been born canonical, there is also zero secret-key overhead. Had it undergone the transformation described above to make it canonical, the secret-key overhead would be non-zero but the public-key overhead would still be zero because the transformation did not change the public key.) The following says that JES is both IND and SUF secure.
Theorem 4.1 Let PKE be a canonical public-key encryption scheme. Let F be defined from it as above. Let DS be an F-keyed signature scheme, and let JES be the corresponding joint encryption and signature scheme constructed above. Assume PKE is IND-CCA secure. Assume DS is simulatable and keyextractable. Then (1) JES is IND secure, and (2) JES is SUF secure.
A full proof of this theorem is in Appendix C. Here we sketch the main ideas. For (1), given an adversary A against the IND security of JES, we build an adversary D against the IND-CCA security of PKE. D will simply run A on simulated auxiliary parameters, using the simulator to answer A's Sign queries and using its own Dec oracle to answer A's Dec queries. A simulation adversary is built alongside, but key extraction is not needed. For (2), given an adversary A against the SUF security of JES, we again build an adversary D against the IND-CCA security of PKE. It will run A with simulated auxiliary parameters, replying to A's oracle queries as before. From a forgery it extracts the secret key, using this to defeat IND-CCA security. Adversaries A 1 and A 2 against simulatability and key-extractability of DS are built alongside to show that D succeeds.
5 RKA-secure signatures from RKA-secure OWFs RKA security is notoriously hard to provably achieve. Recognizing this, several authors [43, 9] have suggested a bootstrapping approach in which we build higher-level RKA-secure primitives from lowerlevel RKA-secure primitives. In this vein, a construction of RKA-secure signatures from RKA-secure PRFs was given in [9] . We improve on this via a construction of RKA-secure signatures from RKA-secure one-way functions. The result is simple: If F is a Φ-RKA-secure OWF then any F-keyed simulatable and key-extractable signature scheme is also Φ-RKA secure. The benefit is that (as we will show) many popular OWFs are already RKA secure and we immediately get new RKA-secure signatures. Figure 3 . In this game, A, like in the basic one-wayness notion, is given y = F.Ev(1 λ , fp, x) and is attempting to find x such that F.Ev(1 λ , fp, x ) = y. Now, however, it has help. It can request that the hidden challenge input x be modified to x = Φ(1 λ , fp, φ, x) for any description φ of its choice, and obtain y = F.Ev(1 λ , fp, x ). This should not help it in its inversion task. The definition is from Goldenberg and Liskov [43] , adapted to our notation, and represents a particularly simple and basic form of RKA security.
Let DS be an F-keyed signature scheme and let Φ be as above. We say that DS is Φ-RKA secure if Adv Figure 3 . In this game, A, like in the basic (strong) unforgeability notion, is given public key pk and is attempting to forge a signature under it. Now, however, it has help beyond its usual signing oracle. It can request that the hidden secret key sk be modified to sk = Φ(1 λ , fp, φ, sk ) for any description φ of its choice, and obtain a signature under sk of any message of its choice. This should not help it in its forgery task. Our definition adapts the one of Bellare, Cash and Miller [9] for Φ-RKA security of arbitrary signature schemes to the special case of F-keyed signature schemes. 5 Construction. Suppose we are given a Φ-RKA secure OWF F and want to build a Φ-RKA secure signature scheme. For the question to even make sense, RKD functions specified by Φ must apply to the secret signing key. Thus, the secret key needs to be an input for the OWF and the public key needs to be the image of the secret key under the OWF. The main technical difficulty is, given F, finding a signature scheme with this property. But this is exactly what a key-versatile signing schema gives us. The following says that if the signature scheme produced by this schema is simulatable and key-extractable then it inherits the Φ-RKA security of the OWF.
Theorem 5.1 Let DS be an F-keyed signature scheme that is simulatable and key-extractable. Let Φ be a class of RKD functions. If F is Φ-RKA secure then DS is also Φ-RKA secure.
A formal proof of this theorem is in Appendix D. The proof extends that of Theorem 3.1. The adversary I that we build uses its Eval oracle to simulate the Sign oracle of the given adversary A. In applying 
(s+s , e+e ) mod q (y+As +e ) mod q Table 1 : Φ-RKA secure OWFs: We succinctly define the families and the Φ-key-simulator showing their Φ malleability and hence their Φ-RKA security.
the simulation and key-extractability, we make crucial use of the fact that the adversaries can obtain signatures under secret keys of their choice.
Finding Φ-RKA OWFs. Theorem 5.1 motivates finding Φ-RKA-secure function families F. The merit of our approach is that there are many such families. To enable systematically identifying them, we adapt the definition of key-malleable PRFs of [8] 
Proof: Let A be a PT adversary attacking the Φ-RKA security of F and let M be a Φ-key-simulator. We construct a PT adversary B against the (regular) one-wayness of F such that Adv (1 λ , fp, y) . When A makes a Eval query φ, adversary B computes y ← M (1 λ , fp, φ, y) and returns y to A. Φ-key malleability says that y = F.Ev(1 λ , fp, Φ(1 λ , fp, φ, x)) as A expects. When A eventually halts and outputs a value x , adversary B does the same.
Previous uses of key-malleability [8, 15] for RKA security required additional conditions on the primitives, such as key-fingerprints in the first case and some form of collision-resistance in the second. For OWFs, it is considerably easier, key-malleability alone sufficing. We now exemplify how to leverage Proposition 5.2 to find Φ-RKA OWFs and thence, via Theorem 5.1, Φ-RKA signature schemes. Table 1 examines three popular one-way functions: discrete exponentiation in a cyclic group, RSA, and the LWE one-way function. It succinctly describes F, Φ, and the Φ-key-simulator M showing Φ-key-malleability. Briefly:
• EXP: The first row of Table 1 shows that exponentiation in any group with hard discrete logarithm problem is Φ-RKA secure for the class Φ of affine functions over the exponent space. Here G is a cyclic group of order m generated by g ∈ G.
• RSA: The second row of Table 1 shows that the RSA function is Φ-RKA secure for the class Φ of functions raising the input to integer powers a, under the assumption that RSA is one-way. Here N is an RSA modulus and e ∈ Z * ϕ(N ) is an encryption exponent. Notice that in this rendition of RSA the latter has no trapdoor.
• LWE: The third row of Table 1 shows that the LWE function is Φ-RKA secure for the class Φ of functions shown. Here A is an n by m matrix over Z q and Φ-RKA-security relies on the standard LWE one-wayness assumption.
The summary is that standard, natural one-way functions are Φ-RKA secure, leading to Φ-RKA security over standard and natural keyspaces. Figure 4 : Game defining Φ-KDM security of a public-key encryption scheme PKE.
KDM-secure storage
Services like Dropbox, Google Drive and Amazon S3 offer outsourced storage. Users see obvious benefits but equally obvious security concerns. We would like to secure this storage, even when messages (files needing to be stored) depend on the keys securing them. If privacy is the only concern, existing KDMsecure encryption schemes (e.g., [21, 27, 5, 4, 31, 32, 20, 7, 53, 3, 29, 30, 12, 41, 49] ) will do the job. However, integrity is just as much of a concern, and adding it without losing KDM security is challenging. This is because conventional ways of adding integrity introduce new keys and create new ways for messages to depend on keys. Key-versatile signing, by leaving the keys unchanged, will provide a solution. We begin below by formalizing our goal of encrypted and authenticated outsourced storage secure for key-dependent messages. In our syntax, the user encrypts and authenticates under her secret key, and then verifies and decrypts under the same secret key, with the public key utilized by the server for verification. Our requirement for KDM security has two components: IND for privacy and SUF for integrity. With the definitions in hand, we take a base KDM-secure encryption scheme and show how, via a key-versatile signature, to obtain storage schemes meeting our goal. Our resulting storage schemes will achieve KDM security with respect to the same class of message-deriving functions Φ as the underlying encryption scheme. Also, we will assume only CPA KDM security of the base scheme, yet achieve CCA KDM privacy for the constructed storage scheme.
Interestingly, our solution uses a public-key base encryption scheme, even though the privacy component of the goal is symmetric and nobody but the user will encrypt. This allows us to start with KDM privacy under keys permitting signatures through key-versatile signing. This represents a novel application for public-key KDM-secure encryption.
KDM security. A class of KDM (key-dependent message) functions Φ is a PT-computable function specifying for each λ ∈ N and each φ ∈ {0, 1} * a map Φ(1 λ , φ, ·) called the message-deriving function described by φ. This map takes input a vector sk (of keys) and returns a string (the message) of length φ.m, where φ.m ∈ N, the output length of φ, is computable in polynomial time given 1 λ , φ. We assume Φ always includes all constant functions. Formally, M describes the function defined by Φ(1 λ , M , sk) = M for all M ∈ {0, 1} * . We say that public-key encryption scheme PKE is Φ-KDM secure if Adv Figure 4 . We require that A make exactly one query to MkKey and that this be its first oracle query. The argument n ≥ 1 determines the number of keys and must be given in unary.
The definition follows [21] except in parameterizing security by the class Φ of allowed messagederiving functions. The parameterization is important because many existing KDM-secure encryption schemes are for particular classes Φ, for example for encryption cycles, affine functions or cliques [27, 4, 29, 30, 49] . We aim to transfer whatever KDM security we have in the encryption to the secure storage, meaning we want to preserve Φ regardless of what it is. Of course a particularly interesting case is that of "full" security, but this is captured as the special case where Φ is all functions.
In the setting of direct practical interest, Alice arguably has just one key, corresponding to the vector sk above having just one component. However, as noted above, much of the literature on KDM security concerns itself with the encryption of cycles and cliques, which represent message-deriving functions on multiple keys, and so our definitions allow the latter.
Secure storage schemes. A storage scheme ST specifies the following PT algorithms: via pp ←$ ST.Pg(1 λ ) one generates public parameters pp common to all users; via (sk , pk ) ←$ ST.Kg(1 λ , pp) a user can generate a secret key sk and corresponding public key pk ; via D ←$ ST.Store(1 λ , pp, sk , M ) a user can produce some data D based on M ∈ {0, 1} * to store on the server; via M ← ST. Retrieve(1 λ , pp, sk , D Figure 5 . In both cases, we require that A make exactly one query to MkKey and that this be its first oracle query, and again the argument n ≥ 1, indicating the number of keys, must be given in unary.
Construction. The base scheme we take as given is a Φ-KDM secure, canonical public-key encryption scheme PKE. As in Section 4, we begin by constructing from PKE a function family F. We do not repeat this construction here, but refer the reader to Section 4. We then let DS be an F-keyed signature scheme that is simulatable and key-extractable. We construct our storage scheme ST as follows:
• ST.Pg(λ): Ret (fp, ap) ←$ DS.Pg(1 λ ). Thus, parameters for ST have the form pp = (fp, ap), where fp are parameters for both F and PKE.
• ST.Kg(1 λ , (fp, ap)): Ret (sk , pk ) ←$ DS.Kg (1 λ , (fp, ap) ). Thus, keys are those of PKE, which are also those of DS.
The following says that our construction provides both privacy and integrity for key-dependent messages, assuming privacy for key-dependent messages of the base encryption scheme and simulatability and keyextractability of the F-keyed signature scheme: Theorem 6.1 Let PKE be a canonical public-key encryption scheme, and let F be defined from it as above. Let DS be an F-keyed signature scheme, and let ST be the corresponding storage scheme constructed above. Let Φ be a class of message-deriving functions. Assume PKE is Φ-KDM secure. Assume DS is simulatable and key-extractable. Then (1) ST is Φ-IND secure and (2) ST is Φ-SUF secure.
A full proof of Theorem 6.1 is in Appendix E. Here we provide sketches to highlight some of the unusual difficulties. Taking first the proof of privacy, we would like, given an adversary A breaking the Φ-IND security of ST, to build an adversary D breaking the assumed Φ-KDM security of PKE. The first
Ret M Figure 5 : Games defining KDM-security of storage scheme ST: Privacy (left) and unforgeability (right).
problem is how D can create the signatures needed to answer Store queries of A, since these rely on secret keys hidden from D. We solve this by switching to simulation parameters, so that D can simulate signatures without a secret key. In answering Retrieve queries, however, we run into another problem: the assumed KDM security of PKE is only under CPA. To solve this, we use the extractor to extract the secret key from signatures and decrypt under it. The full proof involves building simulation and extractability adversaries in addition to D.
Turning next to the proof of unforgeability, we might at first expect that it relies on nothing more than the unforgeability of the signature scheme, so that given an adversary A breaking the Φ-SUF security of ST we could build an adversary breaking the SUF security of DS. However, we run into the basic issue that, since the same keys are used for signing, encryption, and decryption, an adversary against the unforgeability of the signature scheme cannot even construct the messages (ciphertexts) on which A would forge. Instead, we will build from A an adversary D breaking the Φ-KDM security of PKE. This adversary will extract a secret key from a forgery of A and use this to break privacy. To get D to work we must first, as above, switch to simulated signatures, and then use extractability to switch to a simpler Retrieve oracle.
Instantiation. We require our base scheme PKE to be canonical. In Section 4 we showed how to modify an encryption scheme to be canonical while preserving IND-CCA, but the transformation does not in general preserve KDM-security. Instead, we would use KDM-secure schemes that are already canonical. One possibility is the scheme of [53] . The schemes of [27, 7, 4] are not canonical. Figure 6 : Game defining strong unforgeability of signature scheme DS. Figure 6 . We proceed to prove Theorem 3.1. Proof: Let A be a PT adversary playing game SUF. We build PT adversaries I, A 1 , A 2 such that
for all λ ∈ N, from which the theorem follows. The proof uses the games in Figure 7 . These games switch to using simulated parameters and signatures. We will build I, A 1 , A 2 so that for all λ ∈ N we have
Games G 0 and G 1 are identical until bad, so by the Fundamental Lemma of Game-Playing [17] and the above, for all λ ∈ N we have:
as desired. We proceed to the constructions of A 1 , A 2 , I. Adversary A 1 behaves as follows:
When the challenge bit b in game SIM is 0, adversary A 1 simulates for A game G 0 , while if b = 1, adversary A 1 simulates game SUF. We thus have
, which establishes Equation (1). Adversary A 2 behaves as follows:
We skip the simple analysis establishing Equation (2) . Adversary I behaves as follows:
Ret not R(x, w) Figure 8 : Games defining security of NIZK system Π. Left: Game defining zero knowledge. Right: Game defining simulation extractability.
We skip the simple analysis establishing Equation (3).
B Construction: Proof of Theorem 3.2 NIZK systems. Suppose R: {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * → {true, false}. For x ∈ {0, 1} * we let R(x) = { w : R(x, w) = true } be the witness set of x. We say that R is an NP-relation if it is computable in time polynomial in the length of its first input and there is a function such that R(x) ⊆ {0, 1} (|x|) for all x ∈ {0, 1} * . We let L(R) = { x : R(x) = ∅ } be the language associated to R. The fact that R is an NP-relation means that L(R) ∈ NP. A non-interactive (NI) system Π for R specifies the following PT algorithms: via crs ←$ Π.Pg(1 λ ) one generates a common reference string crs; via π ←$ Π.P(1 λ , crs, x, w) the prover given x and w ∈ R(x) generates a proof π that x ∈ L(R); via d ← Π.V(1 λ , crs, x, π) a verifier can produce a decision d ∈ {true, false} regarding whether π is a valid proof that x ∈ L(R). We require completeness, namely Π.V(1 λ , crs, x, Π.P(1 λ , crs, x, w)) = true for all λ ∈ N, all crs ∈ [Π.Pg(λ)], all x ∈ {0, 1} * and all w ∈ R(x). We say that Π is zero-knowledge (ZK) if it specifies additional PT algorithms Π.SimPg and Π.SimP such that Adv Figure 8 . This definition is based on [22, 37] . We say that Π is simulation-extractable (SE) if it specifies an additional PT algorithm Π.Ext such that Adv Before we use such proofs to construct a F-keyed signature scheme, we must know that they exist. The first construction of SE NIZKs (using a stronger notion of simulation extractability) was given in [45] , but for a fairly restricted language related to sets of pairing product equations in bilinear groups. In [38] (and further formalized in [48] ), the authors provide a generic construction of SE NIZKs from a (regular) NIZK, an IND-CCA encryption scheme, and a one-time signature, which establishes that SE NIZKs exist for all NP.
Construction. Let F be the function family given in the theorem statement. We associate to it the NP-relation R defined by R ((1 λ , fp, pk , M ) , sk ) = (F.Ev(1 λ , fp, sk ) = pk ) for all λ ∈ N and all fp, pk , M, sk ∈ {0, 1} * . Let Π be a NI system for R that is zero knowledge and simulation extractable. The signature scheme DS = KvS[F] is specified as follows:
• DS. Kg(1 λ , (fp, crs) ): sk ←$ F. Dom(1 λ , fp) ; pk ← F. Ev(1 λ , fp, sk ) ; Ret (sk , pk ).
• DS.Sig (1 λ , (fp, crs) , sk , M ): pk ← F.Ev(1 λ , fp, sk ) ; Ret Π.P(1 λ , crs, (1 λ , fp, pk , M ), sk ).
• DS.Ver (1 λ , (fp, crs) , pk , M, σ): Ret Π.V(1 λ , crs, (1 λ , fp, pk , M ), σ).
• DS.SimPg(1 λ ): Ret Π.SimPg(1 λ ).
• DS.SimSig (1 λ , (fp, crs) , std , pk , M ): Ret Π. SimP(1 λ , crs, std , (1 λ , fp, pk , M ) ).
• DS. Ext(1 λ , (fp, crs) , xtd , pk , M, σ): Ret Π. Ext(1 λ , crs, xtd , (1 λ , fp, pk , M ), σ) .
Security of the construction. Simulatability of the signature scheme follows directly from the zero knowledge property of the NIZK. Let A be a PT adversary playing game SIM. We construct a PT adversary B such that Adv 
The key extractability of the signature scheme likewise follows from the SE security of the NIZK. Let A be a PT adversary playing game EXT. We construct a PT adversary B such that Adv 
If (pk , M, σ) / ∈ Q in game EXT then ((1 λ , fp, pk , M ), σ) / ∈ Q in game SE, the sets being those defined in the games. Furthermore, by the definition of DS.Ext and R, if sk ← DS.Ext(1 λ , crs, xtd , pk , M, σ) is such that F.Ev(1 λ , fp, sk ) = pk , then R((1 λ , fp, pk , M ), sk ) = false.
C Proof of Theorem 4.1
We say PKE scheme PKE is IND-CCA secure if Adv Figure 9 . The adversary is allowed only one query to LR. This definition is from [10, 35] . We proceed to prove Theorem 4.1. The proof uses the game in Figure 10 . This game switches to using simulated parameters and signatures. We will build A 1 , D so that for all λ ∈ N we have Figure 9 : Game defining IND-CCA security of PKE scheme PKE. 
Using this we have
as desired. We proceed to the constructions of A 1 , D. Adversary A 1 behaves as follows:
Figure 11: Games used in the proof of part (2) of Theorem 4.1: Game G 1 includes the boxed code and G 0 does not.
When the challenge bit b in game SIM is 0, adversary A 1 simulates for A game G 0 , and if b = 1, adversary A 1 simulates game IND. We thus have
, establishing Equation (4) . Adversary D behaves as follows:
We omit the analysis establishing Equation (5).
Part (2): SUF security
Let A be a PT adversary playing game SUF. We build PT adversaries A 1 , A 2 , D such that The proof uses the games in Figure 11 . These games switch to using simulated parameters and signa-tures. We will build A 1 , A 2 , D so that for all λ ∈ N we have
as desired. We proceed to the constructions of A 1 , A 2 , D. Adversary A 1 behaves as follows:
When the challenge bit b in game SIM is 0, adversary A 1 simulates for A game G 0 , and if b = 1, adversary A 1 simulates game SUF. We thus have
, establishing Equation (6) . Adversary A 2 behaves as follows:
We omit the analysis establishing Equation (7). Adversary D behaves as follows: When A wins G 1 we have that F.Ev(1 λ , fp, sk ) = pk , so sk is a valid secret key for pk . By correctness of PKE, we then have PKE.Dec(1 λ , pp, sk , PKE.Enc(1 λ , pp, pk , M b )) = M b , where b is the challenge bit in game IND-CCA, so
. This is because the first term in the difference above is at least Pr[G A 1 (λ)] and the second term is zero. This establishes Equation (8) .
D Proof of Theorem 5.1
Proof: Let A be a PT adversary playing game RKASIG. We build PT adversaries A 1 , A 2 , I such that
for all λ ∈ N, from which the theorem follows.
The proof uses the games in Figure 12 . These games switch to using simulated parameters and signatures. We will build A 1 , A 2 , I so that for all λ ∈ N we have
When the challenge bit b in game SIM is 0, adversary A 1 simulates for A game G 0 , and if b = 1, adversary A 1 simulates game RKASIG. We thus have
, establishing Equation (9) . Adversary A 2 behaves as follows:
If bad is set to true in game G 0 then we have: (1) DS.Ver(1 λ , pp, pk , M, σ) (2) (pk , M, σ) ∈ Q, and (3) F.Ev(1 λ , fp, sk ) = pk . These are exactly the necessary conditions for A 2 to win game EXT, establishing Equation (10) . I behaves as follows:
We omit the analysis establishing Equation (11) .
E Proof of Theorem 6. The proof uses the games in Figure 13 . We build A 1 , A 2 , D and ν(·) such that for all λ ∈ N we have
2 Pr[G
main
/ / G Figure 13 : Games used in the proof of part (1) of Theorem 6.1. Game G 0 includes the boxed code and game G 1 does not.
(In both games, decryption in Retrieve is always done correctly.) Combining this with the above and the Fundamental Lemma of Game-Playing [17] , for all λ ∈ N we have:
as desired. We proceed to the constructions of A 1 , A 2 , D and ν.
Adversary A 1 behaves as follows:
When the challenge bit b in game SIM is 1, adversary A 1 simulates IND. We claim that if b = 0 then A 1 simulates G 0 . This is because in G 0 , procedure Retrieve always performs the correct decryption, regardless of whether or not bad is set, and so does A 1 . (A 1 does not need to invoke the extractor, and indeed could not, since it does not have an extraction trapdoor.) We thus have
Adversary D behaves as follows: We omit the analysis to establish Equation (13). Now we would like to show that G 0 (equivalently, G 1 ) sets bad with negligible probability. Intuitively, this should follow from extractability, since bad is set when extraction fails. A difficulty is that extraction is not required to succeed when (pk [i], C, σ) ∈ Q . So first we show that the latter event is unlikely, and then, assuming it does not happen, that failure of extraction is unlikely. This is formalized via G 2 , which breaks the setting of bad from G 0 into two parts corresponding to the two events of interest. To establish Equation (17) , let E 1 be the event that bad is set by the line 5 "If" statement, and E 2 the event that bad is set by the line 7 "If" statement. We first show the existence of a negligible ν(·) For the first claim, let E be the event that there is a collision in the public keys chosen in MkKey, meaning there are distinct i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that pk[i] = pk[j]. We claim that if this event does not happen, then neither will E 1 . This is because setting bad requires that (pk[i], C, σ) ∈ Q yet ((C, σ), i) ∈ Q, but this cannot happen if the public keys are all distinct. So Pr[E 1 ] ≤ Pr[E]. However, if E does happen with probability that is not negligible, then it is easy to break KDM security of PKE.
An adversary just has to itself sample key-pairs, hoping to get one where the public key matches one of her challenge public keys. In that case, having the corresponding secret key, it is easy to defeat security. We omit the details because this argument is standard.
Adversary A 2 behaves as follows: 
Part (2): SUF security
Let A be a PT adversary playing game SUF. Our first step is to consider a simplified form of the SUF game shown in Figure 14 . Here the adversary does not output a forgery but instead wins via Retrieve queries. We can easily transform A into a PT adversary A such that Adv 
The notation in Equation (16) means that we are considering the event that the game returns true and also bad is not set. Now games G 0 , G 1 are identical until bad so a variant of the Fundamental Lemma of Game-Playing [17] says that Pr[G 
